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Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the
importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in
the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even ser-
vice in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizen-
ship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in
helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it
is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in
life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.'
I. INTRODUCTION
This year marks the fortieth anniversary of the landmark decision
of Brown v. Board Education. The Court's words in that decision are
even truer today than they were four decades ago. The rapid advance of
technology and the intense economic competition from other nations
have raised the educational threshold that every American needs to
attain a decent standard of living. Economic self-sufficiency is no
longer readily available for those who do not have at least a high school
education.2 Education is not only more important to the economic
opportunities of each American, but also to the economic vitality of the
country itself.3
Unfortunately, in a tragically inverse relationship, as time has
increased the importance of being educated, by almost every indicator,
the quality of education delivered to America's children has declined.4
The current breakdown of the American educational system cannot be
attributed to a lack of effort or to a lack of government resources. In
addition to President Johnson's War on Poverty, the unprecedented
peacetime economic growth of the 1980s allowed federal and state gov-
1. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
2. This was recognized by Senator Paul Simon in 1985: "The number of unskilled jobs is
going down, but the pool of unskilled labor is going up. Those two lines present a basic problem
for our society." Steve Sanders, Retraining Forecast as Common in '90s Panelists Urge More
Spending, CHI. TRw., June 18, 1985, at 6C (quoting Senator Simon). "From 1980 to 1991, the
weekly real earnings of full-time workers over the age of 25 who had graduated from college rose
9 percent .... But the real weekly earnings of similar workers who had only completed high
school dropped 7 percent. And similar workers without high school diplomas suffered a drop in
earnings of 14 percent.... [In 1992,] only 3.2 percent [of college graduates] were unemployed
... compared with 11.4 percent of those who had dropped out of high school." Robert B. Reich,
Workers of the World, Get Smart, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1993, at A19.
3. See Steven Greenhouse, Wider Investment Tax Credits Urged, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17,
1993, at C2. The Presidentially-appointed Competitiveness Policy Council reported, "A country
cannot compete effectively unless its human resources are world class, and ours are falling toward
the bottom of the league." Id.
4. See infra part I.A.
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ermnents to make substantial financial investments in the nation's edu-
cational system. "[A]fter allowing for inflation, expenditures per pupil
more than doubled between 1966 and 1989."1 Elementary and secon-
dary public school expenditures went from $75.7 billion in 1970-71 to
$392.6 billion in 1990_91.6 Yet one measure of educational perform-
ance, achievement on the Scholastic Aptitude Test, fell below mid-
1960s levels.7 In 1983, a report entitled "A Nation at Risk" catalogued
in horrific detail the failings of America's educational system. The par-
adox of the past two and one half decades is that as government has
invested more resources in the educational system, the quality of educa-
tion provided in government-operated schools has steadily deteriorated.
A failing educational system is problematic for all Americans, but for
America's urban minority students, it is devastating.
The two most conspicuous methods previously used by the legal
system to remedy the harmful shortcomings of the educational system
were desegregation and school financing litigation. Segregation litiga-
tion was used to rectify the de jure racism that characterized the Ameri-
can educational system prior to Brown; school financing litigation was
employed to improve funding for property-poor school districts. Equal
educational opportunities have been sought for all children, regardless of
race or class, primarily through these two forms of litigation.
Yet after decades of litigation, court orders and legislative fixes, the
very students who these traditional lawsuits were intended to help con-
tinue to receive a woefully substandard education. Many minority stu-
dents in America's largest cities are today consigned to schools which,
by failing to provide for their basic educational needs, are sentencing
them to unproductive lives. 9 Inner city schools have been referred to as
5. Eric A. Hanushek, When School Finance "Reform" May Not Be Good Policy, 28 HARV.
J. ON LEGIs. 423, 428 (1991).
6. NAT'L CENTER FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., DIGEST OF EDUCATION
STATISTICS 1 (1992).
7. Hanushek, supra note 5, at 428. Professor Hanushek also notes other changing aspects of
the educational system which, despite the sagging indicators of student learning, would lead one
to expect an improvement in the educational performance of students. Student/teacher ratios have
steadily fallen from twenty-five students per teacher in public elementary and secondary schools
in 1965, to eighteen students per teacher in 1985; the proportion of teachers holding a master's or
higher-level degree rose from under one-quarter in 1965 to over one-half in 1985; median teacher
experience rose from eight years in 1966 to fifteen in 1986. Id. at 429.
8. See infra notes 14-27 and accompanying text.
9. See supra note 2. The frustration at the utter lack of improvement in urban schools was
aptly described by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990).
"Studies of the most sophisticated design, pilot projects, reams after reams of case histories of
schools, districts, and students, learned treatises, books, television programs-all directed at the
same question: what produces good education in urban schools? The only thing universally
agreed on is that those schools are failing." Id. at 404.
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"the most glaring failures of our American educational system."'" As a
means of bringing equal educational opportunities to the neediest stu-
dents, the traditional education litigation efforts have fallen short of their
goals."
Perhaps the single biggest shortcoming of these traditional litiga-
tion approaches is that attaining quality in education for needy students
has never been an objective in its own right.'2 In the parlance of Ameri-
can pop culture, previous litigation efforts have been "quality-free." The
implicit assumption underlying these traditional lawsuits was that court-
enforced integration orders and finance equalization laws would indi-
rectly uplift the quality of education for these particular students. After
decades of litigation, this strategy either does not work or will take a few
more decades to work. Either way, minority urban students cannot
afford to wait to find out the answer. They need to receive the benefits
of a quality education today.
This Comment will now address the "quality-free" inadequacy of
traditional litigation approaches. An innovative litigation strategy
designed to provide America's neediest students with true equal educa-
tional opportunities and true educational quality is needed immediately.
A new litigation paradigm must be constructed, one that achieves real
equality in the quality of educational opportunities.
This Comment will suggest a blueprint for this new education liti-
gation model. Three distinct features characterize this new paradigm:
10. Charls S. Benson, Definitions of Equity in School Finance in Texas, New Jersey, and
Kentucky, 28 HRv. J. ON LEGIS. 401, 413 (1991).
11. De facto segregation plagues many urban schools. See infra notes 182-195. In states
where funding equalization has occurred, no noticeable gains in educational quality have taken
place over those states where interdistrict spending disparity remains legally problematic. Two
examples are California and Connecticut. California has one of the most equalized school finance
formulas, yet the quality of education in California is not significantly higher than in other states.
Rochelle L. Stanfield, Learning Curve, NAT'L J., July 3, 1993, at 1691. California students rank
34th in the nation on SAT achievement and 29th on NAEP tests. Bruno Manno, Deliver Us from
Clinton's Schools Bill, WALL ST. J., June 22, 1993, at A14. Connecticut has also had successful
finance-equity legislation which increased and equalized expenditures for predominantly minority
students, yet the performance of these students has remained "depressingly low." See James S.
Liebman, Implementing Brown, 76 VA. L. REV. 349, 392-93 (1990). One commentator has
suggested that further school financing challenges will exacerbate the existing problems in the
school system until the issue of school efficiency is addressed. See Hanushek, supra note 5, at
453. Helen Hershkoff, the associate legal director of the American Civil Liberties Union,
acknowledged the shortcomings of finance equalization as a tool for improving education when
she stated, "The problems go deeper than fiscal equity." William Celis 3d, School Financing:
Arguing Equity is Not Enough, N.Y. TIMES, April 29, 1992, at B8 (quoting Ms. Hershkoff).
12. "[E]quitable funding for our public schools has dominated our three opinions and the
ensuing legislative debate. Only in passing has the quality of the public education system in
Texas been addressed. Yet our system of public education languishes in mediocrity with no
improvement in sight." Carrollton-Farmers v. Edgewood Indep., 826 S.W.2d 489, 525 (Tex.
1992) (Cornyn, J., concurring and dissenting). See also Hanushek, supra note 5, at 449.
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(1) The states should have a duty imposed upon them under the United
States Constitution and/or many state constitutions to provide their stu-
dents with an education of minimum quality or adequacy, (2) The
legally required minimum quality of education in a particular school or
school district should be measured by aggregate student learning in basic
subjects (educational output), not by processes, programs, procedures or
per pupil expenditures (educational input), and (3) The remedy for a
state's failure to meet its duty should be designed so as to provide
aggrieved plaintiffs with immediate and instantaneous opportunities for
a quality education. This Comment will review the legal arguments
available to plaintiffs who may challenge states and school systems
under this new litigation paradigm. Section II will assess the current
state of the American educational system and note the disproportionate,
destructive effects of the educational system's inadequacies on minority
students. Section III will refer to the United States Constitution to deter-
mine the government's duty to provide students with a certain minimum
quality of education. Section IV will look at various state constitution
education clauses and review state supreme court cases to analyze the
duty that states have imposed upon themselves to provide students with
an education of a certain basic quality. Section V will discuss the merits
of measuring the legally required educational quality by output measures
instead of input measures. Section VI will discuss the merits of an inno-
vative remedy that could provide plaintiff schoolchildren with a quality
education instantaneously.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM
A. In General
The value of receiving a quality education in today's information
society is inestimable. Just as industrialization created the need for
workers to possess more "knowledge, skills and training,"' 13 the post-
industrial era requires workers to possess even greater knowledge and
skills. Yet much evidence supports the conclusion that American
schools are failing to meet this post-industrial challenge.
The report receiving the most attention during the last decade for
highlighting the inadequacies of the American school system is the
National Commission on Excellence in Education's report "A Nation at
Risk."'14 The Commission's findings starkly display the shortcomings of
the American educational system. "The educational foundations of our
13. Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in
Basic Skills, 63 TEX. L. REv. 777, 783 (1985).
14. NATIONAL COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUc., A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR
EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1983) [hereinafter NATIONAL COMM'N, NATION AT RISK].
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society are presently being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity that
threatens our very future as a nation and a people," the report states.
"We have, in effect, been committing an act of unthinking, unilateral
educational disarmament."' 5
The commission found that nearly 40% of 17-year-olds could not
draw inferences from written materials, only 20% could write a persua-
sive essay, and only one-third could solve a math problem entailing sev-
eral steps. 16 The Commission also noted that an incredibly high
percentage of American students were functionally illiterate: 13% of all
seventeen-year-olds, and up to 40% of all young adults.
17
Even five years after "A Nation at Risk" sounded the siren call for
improvement in American education, Education Secretary William J.
Bennett concluded that American students' educational performance
was lacking."8 Again, the data in 1988 showed that American students
were receiving a substandard education. American students finished last
in international comparisons of math performance, fewer than 40% of
those between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-five could read well
enough to interpret a newspaper article, and one in three seventeen-year-
olds did not know that Abraham Lincoln was the President who issued
the Emancipation Proclamation. 19
More recently, additional evidence of the school system's failure
has surfaced. Only 72% of fourth graders can do third grade math and
only 14% of eighth-graders can do seventh-grade math. 20 Eighteen to
twenty-four-year-old Americans finished last among ten countries,
including Mexico, in a 1989 National Geographic survey of geography
knowledge.2' A 1991 National Assessment of Educational Progress test
revealed that half of America's eighth graders scored just above the pro-
ficiency level expected of fifth-grade students.22
The high number of uneducated students affects American society
in many negative ways. Functionally illiterate adults are very likely to
be unable to find a job.23 Not surprisingly, functional illiterates com-
15. NATIONAL COMM'N, NATION AT RISK, quoted in WILLIAM J. BENNETT, THE DE-VALUING
OF AMERICA 42 (1992).
16. NATIONAL COMM'N, NATION AT RISK 8-9, quoted in Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical
Foundations for a Right to Education Under the US. Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the
National Education Crisis, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 550, 555 (1992).
17. NATIONAL COMM'N, NATION AT RISK 8, quoted in Bitensky, supra note 16, at 555.
18. Bitensky, supra note 16, at 556.
19. Id.
20. BENNETT, supra note 15, at 43.
21. Id.
22. Barbara Kantrowitz & Pat Wingert, A Dismal Report Card, NEWSWEEK, June 17, 1991, at
64.
23. See Ratner, supra note 13, at 784.
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prise a high number of those who commit crimes. Some estimates sug-
gest that as many as "60 to 80 percent of the nation's prison population
is functionally illiterate; '2 4 only one in four prisoners has a high school
diploma.25 The cost of incarcerating these criminals is high, as is the
cost of providing government assistance to illiterates who do not commit
crimes.26 The cost of crime itself takes a toll on society as well, with
one of every four households affected by crime every year.27 Beyond
the measurable costs to society, the ultimate cost is borne by the person
whose human dignity has been degraded by an inability to achieve a
meaningful existence due to receiving an inadequate education from his/
her government.
B. Minorities and the Urban Schools
In the ideal classless society, a miserable government-run educa-
tional system would harm all members of society in equal proportions.
In a stratified society such as America's, a crumbling educational system
wreaks disproportionate damage on those at the bottom of the class sys-
tem. Because members of minority groups have historically been dis-
criminated against, they are much more likely to be poor, and as a result,
are more in need of a quality education. Minorities receive dispropor-
tionate harm from the school system's failings. Unlike those who have
the financial ability to secure good schooling by sending their children
to private schools or by moving to a better school district, minority par-
ents are disproportionately forced to bear the full brunt of the public
school system's inadequacies head on. Providing minority citizens with
substandard education dramatically lessens their prospects for entering
society's economic and social mainstream.
For those who do not receive an adequate education, the conse-
quences are debilitating. "Inadequate education ...perpetuates eco-
nomic caste distinctions. 28 Some civil rights activists fear that minority
students who fail to learn the necessary critical thinking skills provided
by a quality education will become modem-day serfs, relegated to a
meaningless social existence.29 The harmful consequences of the low
quality education received by many minorities is best stated by Charles
Murray in his book Losing Ground. "[T]he gap in educational achieve-
24. See Ratner, supra note 13, at 784 n.18. See also Bitensky, supra note 16, at 559.
25. Bitensky, supra note 16, at 559.
26. See Ratner, supra note 13, at 784.
27. Bitensky, supra note 16, at 559.
28. Julius Chambers, Adequate Education for All: A Right, An Achievable Goal, 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 55, 58 (1987).
29. Bob Moses, an organizer of the 1964 Freedom Summer, quoted in Alexis Jetter,
Mississippi Learning, N. Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Feb. 21, 1993, at 28, 30.
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ment between black and white students leaving high school [is] so great
that it threaten[s] to defeat any other attempts to narrow the economic
differences separating blacks and whites."3
The disparities between the academic performance of black and
white students continue to divide the potential economic opportunities
between them. Two Brookings Institute scholars have concluded:
"Minorities have made only modest progress in reducing the yawning
gap that separates their academic achievement from that of nonminori-
ties, and they continue to exhibit alarming rates of illiteracy and high
school noncompletion."13 1 It has been reported that "[o]n standardized
achievement tests in reading,... black nine-year-olds scored an average
of ten points lower than white nine-year-olds. 32 In addition, as many as
forty percent of minority youth are functionally illiterate.33 Only "one in
ten black young adults and two in ten Hispanic young adults can satis-
factorily interpret a newspaper column.1 34 And "[t]he 'unofficial' drop-
out rate.., for some urban high schools in New Jersey can be as high as
47%."35 Blacks and other minority students are far more likely to drop
out of high school than are white students.36 "[B]lack youths are 60%
more likely and Hispanic youths are 290% more likely to drop out of
secondary school than whites. '37 There has been a decrease in the per-
centage of black high school graduates that enroll in college while white
enrollment has held steady.38 According to the Urban Institute, "[t]he
reading scores of black 17-year-olds from disadvantaged urban commu-
nities are no better than the reading scores of white 13-year-olds from
more advantaged communities. '39 These dismal statistics are made
worse by the fact that a type of resegregation appears to be taking place
in the nation's urban schools.4 °
30. CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND 105 (1984).
31. John E. Chubb & Terry M. Moe, Effective Schools and Equal Opportunity, in PUBLIC
VALUES, PRIVATE SCHOOLS 161-183 (Neal E. Devins ed., 1989). For a brief description of the
educational performance of minority and low-income students in Texas, see also Allan E. Parker,
Jr. & Michael David Weiss, Litigating Edgewood: Constitutional Standards and Application to
Educational Choice, 10 REv. LITIG. 599, 614-15 (1991).
32. Chambers, supra note 28, at 57 n.12.
33. Id. at 57.
34. BENNETT, supra note 15, at 43.
35. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 401 (N.J. 1990).
36. Chambers, supra note 28, at 56.
37. George C. Galster, Polarization, Place and Race, 71 N.C. L. Rav. 1421, 1423 (1993).
38. Chambers, supra note 28, at 56.
39. Michael A. Stegman, National Urban Policy Revisited, 71 N.C. L. REv. 1737, 1747
(1993) (quoting THE URBAN INST., CONFRONTING THE NATION'S URBAN CRISIS: FROM WATTS
(1965) TO SOUTH CENTRAL LOS ANGELES 3 (1992)).
40. See infra notes 182-195 and accompanying text. Public school spending in urban areas is
anything but frugal. In Milwaukee, Wisconsin, educators spend $6,000 per year on each student.
Rogers Worthington, Split Milwaukee School System Urged, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 28, 1991, at M3. In
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In the context of this brief summary of the state of American educa-
tion today, this Comment will now look at the Federal and state constitu-
tions to determine potential sources of rights to a minimum level of
education and the corresponding duties owed by the states to provide
such an education.
III. THE RIGHT TO AN ADEQUATE EDUCATION UNDER THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION
Aside from the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of
Education, the high court's decision in San Antonio School District v.
Rodriguez4' is its most well-known modem case dealing with educa-
tion.42 The black letter constitutional law that most law students learn
from Rodriguez is that no constitutional right to an education exists.
This limited view of Rodriguez holds true only in the context of tradi-
tional old paradigm litigation strategies. In the new litigation paradigm,
Rodriguez is potentially a right-creating case, and not a right-limiting
case. Both commentators and the Court itself have recognized this
potential application of Rodriguez and generally agree that Rodriguez
has left open the possibility of a constitutional right to a certain mini-
mum level or "floor" of education that government must provide.43
Rodriguez was a typical Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
challenge to the State of Texas's school financing mechanism. In Rodri-
guez, the plaintiffs challenged the state's educational financing scheme.
The scheme, similar to other states' financing schemes at that time,
relied heavily upon local property taxation as the source of revenue for
each school district. As a result of this heavy reliance, substantial
interdistrict disparities resulted in school expenditures." Property-rich
New York City, educators spend $7,300 per year on each student. Seth Mydans, Teachers Union
in Los Angeles Accepts Pay Cut, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1993, at L7. In Washington, D.C.,
educators spend about $9,000 per year on each student, almost as much as the tuition at the
exclusive private school President Bill Clinton and his wife Hillary send their daughter. Tex
Lezar, School Choice Actually Saves Public Money, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 5, 1993, at
23A. Detroit educators spend $4,100 per year on each student. Detroit Given Deadline to Find
Truant Students, Cm. TRIB., Sept. 20, 1990, at M3. Given these numbers, it would be hard to
make the case that what's needed in the urban school systems is more money. See, e.g., Abbott v.
Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 363 (N.J. 1990).
41. 411 U.S. 1 (1972).
42. In the previous two decades, no other schooling issue except racial segregation has
received the same attention as school financing issues. See Hanushek, supra note 5, at 423 n. I.
43. See, e.g., Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 284 (1985); TYLL vAN GEEL, AUTHORITY TO
CONTROL THE SCHOOL PRoGRAM 39 (1976); Chambers, supra note 28, at 68; Penelope A.
Preovolos, Rodriguez Revisited: Federalism, Meaningful Access, and the Right to Adequate
Education, 20 SANTA CLARA L. Rev. 75, 83 (1980); Patricia M. Harris, Note, Student Fees in
Public Schools: Defining the Scope of Education, 72 IOWA L. Rv. 1401, 1413 (1987).
44. 411 U.S. at 15.
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districts had a greater capacity to raise funds for school expenditures
than did property-poor districts. The plaintiffs in Rodriguez alleged that
these relative disparities themselves violated the Equal Protection
Clause, but never contended that the quality of education received in the
poorer districts fell below a constitutionally required minimum.4s
The Court failed to apply the strict scrutiny standard of review
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
instead found the financing system constitutional using the rational basis
standard. The Court reasoned that no suspect class was involved and
that education was not a fundamental right deserving strict scrutiny.46
While the Court refused to rule that the severe funding inequities
themselves violated the Constitution in a strict equal protection context,
it explicitly suggested that a minimally adequate education could receive
federal constitutional protection.47 The Court stated, "[e]ven if it were
conceded that some identifiable quantum of education is a constitution-
ally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either right [to
speak or to vote], we have no indication that the present levels of educa-
tional expenditures in Texas provide an education that falls short4" [of
such a hypothesized constitutional prerequisite]. 49  The Court
continued,
Whatever merit appellees' argument might have if a State's financing
system occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities to
any of its children, that argument provides no basis for finding an
interference with fundamental rights where only relative differences
in spending levels are involved and where-as is true in the present
case-no charge fairly could be made that the system fails to provide
each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills
necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full partici-
pation in the political process.50
The plaintiffs' fatal flaw was that they never denied the State of
Texas's assertions that they were receiving an adequate education.5"
Having no evidence that the plaintiffs were receiving an education fall-
45. Id. at 37.
46. "[T]he Court concluded that classifying children on the basis of district wealth, as
opposed to their personal family wealth, did not amount to a suspect classification .... " vAN
GEEL, supra note 43, at 102. In its oft-quoted statement in Rodriguez, the Court stated,
"Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal
Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected." 411 U.S. at 35.
See VAN GEEL, supra note 43, at 39.
47. 411 U.S. at 36-37.
48. Id.
49. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 284 (1985) (quoting Rodriquez, 411 U.S. at 36-37).
50. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37 (emphasis added).
51. 411 U.S. at 24. See also Preovolos, supra note 43, at 75.
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ing below a hypothesized constitutional floor, the. Supreme Court was
forced to decide the case based simply on expenditure differences, not
on the actual quality of education students in poorer districts were
receiving. Plaintiffs only demonstrated that they suffered a relative dis-
advantage, not an absolute harm.52 The Court's opinion that such rela-
tive disadvantages are not protected by the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment explains the traditional interpretation of
Rodriguez as a decision that limited the right to education. However, the
Court never stated what it would have decided had the plaintiffs demon-
strated that the quality of education in the schools descended below a
certain level on an absolute, not relative, scale.
So while Rodriguez may have closed one door to recognition of a
constitutional right to education, it simultaneously opened another door
for recognizing of such a right based on the inadequacy of educational
outcomes.
The single Supreme Court case that supports this conclusion more
than any other is the 1985 decision in Papasan v. Allain. 4 In Papasan,
the Supreme Court explicitly stated that the question of whether a mini-
mally adequate education deserved constitutional protection was still an
open one. "[T]his Court has not yet definitively settled the questions
whether a minimally adequate education is a fundamental right. . .."
With respect to the holding in Rodriguez, the Court in Papasan stated,
"[t]he Court did not, however, foreclose the possibility 'that some identi-
fiable quantum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite
to the meaningful exercise of either [the right to speak or the right to
vote].' ",56 This statement by the Court is crucial because "the Court
confirmed what was not quite said outright before-it remains an open
question whether there can be a positive right to education under the
Constitution." 5 7
The Supreme Court's recognition of the possibility of a constitu-
tional right to an "identifiable quantum of education" certainly helps
prospective plaintiffs who believe they are receiving an inadequate edu-
cation in an absolute sense. Remarkably, despite the scope of the educa-
tional crisis, no plaintiff has yet taken the Supreme Court up on the
invitation first extended in Rodriguez, and reaffirmed in Papasan, to
challenge the adequacy of state-provided education solely on the basis of
52. Chambers, supra note 28, at 68.
53. See Preovolos, supra note 43, at 83; Chambers, supra note 28, at 68; Ratner, supra note
13, at 831.
54. 478 U.S. 265 (1985).
55. 478 U.s. at 285.
56. Id. at 284 (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36).
57. Bitensky, supra note 16, at 570.
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a minimum quality. 8
This may be due to the difficulty of actually identifying the quan-
tum of education that merits constitutional protection. In other words,
how poor would the quality of education have to be before the Supreme
Court could determine that one's constitutional rights are violated? 59 No
federal court has yet ventured to define a minimally adequate educa-
tion.60 Section IV of this Comment will suggest, as part of a new model
of litigation, a method for courts to use in making this determination. In
any case, the Supreme Court has left the courthouse doors wide open for
a future plaintiff to offer proof that a school system has not provided
him/her with the opportunity to acquire a minimally adequate education
in an absolute sense.6'
IV. THE RIGHT TO AN ADEQUATE EDUCATION UNDER
STATE CONSTITUTIONS
Because the United States Constitution does not explicitly mention
a right to education, the possibility of a federal right to a minimally
adequate education derives from a person's right of expression and right
to vote. 62 State constitutions, unlike the federal Constitution, do not suf-
fer from the absence of provisions regarding education. Thus, plaintiffs
proceeding under state constitutions have more concrete grounds on
which to base their claims. While no state constitution explicitly grants
its citizens a fundamental right to education, all have education clauses
that require the state to provide free public schooling.63 These clauses
offer aggrieved plaintiffs the most direct method of challenging inade-
quate educational opportunities.6 Education litigation involving these
clauses has become increasingly popular in the last fifteen years.65
A. Different Categories of State Constitution Education Clauses
State constitution provisions on education differ considerably,
although all impose duties on the state to provide some form of public
58. One explanation, of course, is that such a challenge does not conform to the traditional
litigation models.
59. This is assuming that the state is providing children with an education of some sort. If the
state refuses to provide any education at all, it has no duty to provide education to all children on
equal terms. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1981).
60. See Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform Litigation,
28 HARv. J. oN LEils. 307, 327 n.88 (1991).
61. See, e.g., Chambers, supra note 28, at 70.
62. See supra part III.
63. McUsic, supra note 60, at 311; Bitensky, supra note 16, at 587.
64. See Ratner, supra note 13, at 814. See also McUsic, supra note 60, at 308.
65. See infra part IV.B.
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education.66 Commentators have tried to group the states' education
clauses into different categories. The earliest attempts to categorize state
education clauses failed to respect the distinction between claims based
on equity of financing and claims based on minimum education stan-
dards.67 These older categorizations focused on the equity of the school
system required by the states' education clauses, not on the states' duty
to provide a certain quality of education.
Recently, however, a new categorization of state constitutional edu-
cation provisions has been outlined that recognizes possible state consti-
tutional claims under a minimum quality education theory.68 This new
categorization is based upon language in state constitutions that can be
interpreted as requiring a certain quality of education. Looking at the
state education clauses from this minimum quality, new litigation para-
digm perspective, the different types of state clauses fall into four
categories.
The first type of clause requires a guarantee of high quality and
directs states to provide an "explicit and significant level of educa-
tion."' 69  The second category of education clause does not contain as
strong a commitment to quality as those in the first group, but does com-
mand the state legislatures to provide for educational improvement,7 ° or
to adopt all suitable means to educate its people.71 Constitutions which
66. Ratner, supra note 13, at 815-16.
67. See McUsic, supra note 60, at 309 n.4. This initial categorization separated the types of
clauses into four groups and was based upon a 1974 article by Professor Grubb which separated
the state constitutions by their ability to provide a right to bilingual education. See Erica B.
Grubb, Breaking the Language Barrier: The Right to Bilingual Education, 9 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 52, 66-70 (1974). The first group contains the weakest language for plaintiffs to use; it
merely establishes public schools. The second group of state constitution education clauses
declares that the state shall provide a "thorough and efficient" school system. The third group
contains stronger language, such as calling for advancement of education by "all suitable means."
The fourth group, containing the strongest provisions, defines the state's duty to provide education
as "paramount." See Ratner, supra note 13, at 815-16.
68. Because it recognizes the possibility of minimum quality claims under state constitution
education clauses, the categorization framework used here follows and relies on that developed by
McUsic, supra note 60, at 333-39. But even McUsic's minimum quality categorization is
seemingly intended to be used in school finance reform litigation, not minimum quality type
litigation as proposed in this article. See McUsic, supra note 60, at 317. Some state courts have
found their constitution to require a minimum quality of education. See infra part IV.B.l-3.
69. McUsic, supra note 60, at 334. The constitutions of Virginia and Illinois require a "high
quality" public education. The Virginia General Assembly is required to "ensure that an
educational program of high quality is established and continually maintained." VA. CONST. art.
VIII, § 1. The Illinois Constitution requires the state to "provide for an efficient system of high
quality public educational institutions and services." ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1. Other states require
a system of "quality" schools or for "ample provision" to be made for the education of all
children. MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1(1); WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
70. Amiz. CONST. art. XI, § 10; KAN. CONST. art. VI, § I.
71. ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; R.I. CONST. art. XII, § I; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § I.
1994]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
mandate a "thorough and efficient," or simply "efficient" educational
system fall into this category as well.72 The state constitution education
provisions in the third class fall into two subcategories: those which
"encourage,". "promote," or "cherish" specific and broad educational
standards, and those which require only an "adequate" or "sufficient"
education.73 The final category of education clauses offers the weakest
support for minimum quality claims and again falls into two sub-groups:
those which merely require establishment of a "uniform," "general," or
"thorough" system of schools, 74 and those which merely require the leg-
islature to set up and maintain a system of schools.75
B. Litigation Using the State Constitution Education Clauses
The use of these educational clauses in school reform litigation is a
fairly recent phenomenon. Because plaintiffs in past traditional educa-
tion litigation sought greater equality in school district funding, they pre-
ferred to litigate under the equal protection clauses found in most state
constitutions. However, this strategy produced less than the desired
results in some cases, thus education litigators looked elsewhere to
ground the state's duty to equalize school financing. They began to use
state constitution education clauses as a possible means to achieve the
success in school financing litigation that state equal protection clauses
could not provide.76
The evolving trend in litigation using these state education clauses
is heading in a direction favorable to those who wish to legally challenge
the educational system based solely upon a minimum quality, or basic
standards claim. The use of these clauses has steadily progressed from
challenges to school financing to challenges of inadequate quality of
education.77 Courts have gone from analyzing school funding formulas
72. These include: DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1, sec. 1; Ky. CONST. § 183; MD. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 1; MINN. CoNsT. art. XIII, § 1; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1; OHIo CONST. art. VI, § 2; PA.
CONST. art. III, § 14; TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1; W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § I.
73. See McUsic, supra note 60, at 336. CAL. CONsT. art. IX, § i; FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1;
GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. IX, 2d div., § 3; MASS.
CONST. pt. 2, ch. V, § II; NEV. CONST. art. 11, § 1; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 83; N.M. CoNST. art.
XII, § 1; N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 4.
74. Included in this category are: COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1; OR.
CONST. art. VIII, § 3; WIs. CoNsT. art. X, § 3.
75. ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2, sec. 2; Miss. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 201; Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a); N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1; OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; S.C.
CONsT. art. XI, § 3; UTAH CONsT. art. X, § 1.
76. Some states' school financing laws were invalidated under the particular state
constitution's equal protection clause. See Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 953 (1976).
77. McUsic, supra note 60, at 308-09. For a listing of some of the cases litigated under these
changing theories, see Jonathan Banks, Note, State Constitutional Analyses of Public School
Finance Reform Cases: Myth or Methodology?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 129, 133 nn.19-21 (1991).
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and expenditures to evaluating the level and quality of education being
provided to students.
Following a litigation taxonomy accepted by a number of commen-
tators, school finance litigation has been described as taking place in
three separate "waves. 'T The first wave challenged school financing
systems under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court's decision
in Rodriguez closed this avenue of litigation. The second wave began
after Rodriguez and involved challenges to state school financing sys-
tems under state constitution equal protection clauses and state constitu-
tion education clauses.79
The third wave, currently underway, is the challenge to financing
systems based solely upon state constitution education clauses, rather
than jointly with the state's equal protection clauses as in wave two.8 0
Within wave three, two distinct strands of claims exist."s The first
strand is the more traditional equity financing challenge. The second
strand, however, offers hope for a new paradigm of education litigation:
it is a claim that the state has failed to meet its duty, under the state
constitution education provision, to provide a minimum quality standard
of education. This newly developing strand of litigation is significant
because, for the first time, courts are willing to judge the state constitu-
tional adequacy of the state's educational system using a standard other
than equality of per pupil spending. 2 It is important to note that a case
challenging a state's failure to fulfill its duty under the state constitution
education clause has never been based solely on a minimum quality
standards claim. However, the trend is undeniably heading in this
direction.8 3
Although all of the cases litigated thus far have been decided in the
equity financing context, the decisions can be analyzed to determine the
possibility for a successful challenge to a violation of a state constitution
According to David S. Tatel, an attorney specializing in school financing, "Most of the litigation
in the past decade focused on equity .... But what's been happening in the past few years is
people are increasingly focusing on adequacy. This is the cutting edge of education litigation."
See Celis, supra note 11, at B8.
78. See Gail F. Levine, Note, Meeting the Third Wave: Legislative Approaches to Recent
Judicial School Finance Rulings, 28 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 507-08, 507 n. 1 (1991).
79. Id. at 507-08. According to Levine, these first two waves produced few victories.
80. Id. at 508.
81. See McUsic, supra note 60, at 308, 326.
82. See McUsic, supra note 60, at 326 n.87. In deciding questions of minimum quality,
courts still look at per pupil spending numbers, although those statistics are not central to the
holding of these cases.
83. See McUsic, supra note 60, at 326 n.87 (Rose, Abbott, and Pauley were not solely
minimum standards decisions, but a blend of equity and minimum standard rationales). See also
Banks, supra note 77, at 147.
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education clause based solely on a minimum quality standard. Indeed,
many of the cases contain language that can fairly and reasonably be
construed as placing a duty upon states with strong constitutional educa-
tion clauses to provide students with an education of a certain minimum
quality, even in the absence of a school financing challenge. Although
in these third wave cases courts are still speaking in an equal financing
context, their language conveys more than just a duty to remedy interdis-
trict financing disparities; it conveys the duty to give students a particu-
lar quality of education. Three third wave cases particularly support this
position.84
1. PAULEY V. KELLA85
Pauley was a landmark decision, decided in 1979. The reason for
its distinction was its unprecedented interpretation of West Virginia's
state constitution education clause, which contains the "thorough and
efficient" language used in many other state constitutions.8 6 The first
section of West Virginia's education article states: "The legislature shall
provide, by general law, for a thorough and efficient system of free
schools. 8 7 Pauley involved a challenge to the state's financing system,
but the court devoted a significant portion of its opinion to interpreting
the meaning of the state constitution's "thorough and efficient" clause.
In doing so, the court noted that it was entering an "unexplored" area."8
After an extensive historical analysis, the court arrived at its definition
of a "thorough and efficient" education: "It develops, as best the state of
education expertise allows, the minds, bodies and social morality of its
charges to prepare them for useful and happy occupations, recreation
and citizenship, and does so economically."8 9 The court then went on to
list some of the legally recognized elements of this definition. Among
these were literacy and the ability to add, subtract, multiply, and divide
numbers. The court also stated that the clause itself requires the devel-
opment of high quality educational standards.9"
Furthermore, Pauley advocated a strong role for the judiciary in
enforcing state constitutional education standards. "There is ... ample
84. The fourth case in this category is Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (1978) (en
banc). Because of the uniqueness of the Washington state constitution education clause (a
"paramount duty" provision), it will not be discussed in this comment. See WASH. CONST. art. IX,
§ 1. It is still worth noting that the court in this case spoke of a constitutionally required minimum
education standard under this provision. 585 P.2d at 95. See Ratner, supra note 13, at 820.
85. 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979).
86. See supra notes 69-71.
87. W. VA. CONsT. art. XII, § 1.
88. 255 S.E.2d at 865 n.8.
89. Id. at 877.
90. Id. at 878.
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authority [from many jurisdictions] that courts will enforce constitution-
ally mandated education quality standards." 91 This is important because
of the possible reluctance of some courts to uphold quality standards
under state education clauses. In Pauley, the Supreme Court of West
Virginia made clear its duty to enforce state constitutional requirements
related to education.
Pauley's significance is that it interpreted the state constitutional
education provision to establish a duty to provide a certain quality of
education to every child, not simply a required level of expenditure. 92
Pauley began to answer questions about the content of a state's duty
under its education clause. This case is also notable because the duty it
imposes on the state cannot be satisfied merely by meeting certain input
requirements, but only by successfully educating students.93
2. ROSE v. COUNCIL FOR BETTER EDUCATION, INC.
Rose v. Councilfor Better Education, Inc.," decided in 1989, chal-
lenged the state's school financing system as unconstitutional under
Kentucky's state constitution education article. There are two remarka-
ble points about the court's decision in Rose: (1) its relative neglect of
the traditional judicial concern with interdistrict financing disparities and
its focus upon the quality of the schools in the state, and (2) its ruling
that the entire school system, not simply a statute, was invalid under the
state constitution.9"
Kentucky's state constitution education clause states: "The General
Assembly shall, by appropriate legislation, provide for an efficient sys-
tem of common schools throughout the State." 96 The court, without
much guidance from previous state court decisions, sought to determine
whether the school system in Kentucky fulfilled the state's duty of being
"efficient." 97 The court rejected the defendant's argument that the legis-
lature has the sole and exclusive authority to determine whether or not
the state school system is efficient.9" In a bold statement regarding the
judicial role with respect to state education, the court said, "Courts may,
should and have involved themselves in defining the standards of a con-
stitutionally mandated educational system."99 In ruling the entire Ken-
91. Id. at 874.
92. See Ratner, supra note 13, at 819.
93. Ratner, supra note 13, at 819.
94. 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
95. See Benson, supra note 10, at 417. Benson acknowledges that financial questions did
play a role, but this role was only "subsidiary."
96. Ky. CONST. § 183.
97. 790 S.W.2d at 205.
98. Id. at 208-09.
99. Id. at 210.
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tucky school system unconstitutional, the court outlined nine
characteristics of an "efficient" system of public schools.10 Issuing no
remedy to the plaintiffs, the court left the task of re-creating a constitu-
tional system to the Kentucky General Assembly.' 0 ' In his concurring
opinion, Justice Gant stated that the Court has a duty to declare a remedy
and that he would have issued a writ of mandamus compelling perform-
ance of a "plain duty" required by the constitution.'0 2 Again, the court's
focus on the standard of education, and not simply the disparity in fund-
ing departs from the traditional judicial method of analyzing a school
system's adequacy under the state constitution.
3. ABBOt V. BURKE
In Abbott v. Burke,"°3 decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court in
1990, the court found that the state's education law violated the state
constitution's "thorough and efficient" education clause. This case
involved a school financing challenge, which was surprising because in
recent years, New Jersey spent more money per pupil than any other
state in the continental United States. 'I The court in Abbott did not get
involved too deeply in the nuances of education finance.' 0 5 The court
instead noted that its past decisions had made clear that the state consti-
tution did not mandate equal expenditures per pupil, but instead required
a certain level of educational content and quality. 106 The court then con-
cluded that the quality and level of education provided in certain poorer
urban districts did not satisfy the state constitution's "thorough and effi-
100. Id. at 212-13. These characteristics include:
1) The establishment, maintenance and funding of common schools in Kentucky is
the sole responsibility of the General Assembly. 2) Common schools shall be free
to all. 3) Common schools shall be available to all Kentucky children. 4) Common
schools shall be substantially uniform throughout the state. 5) Common schools
shall provide equal educational opportunities to all Kentucky children, regardless of
place of residence or economic circumstances. 6) Common schools shall be
monitored by the General Assembly to assure that they are operated with no waste,
no duplication, no mismanagement, and with no political influence. 7) The premise
for the existence of common schools is that all children in Kentucky have a
constitutional right to an adequate education. 8) The General Assembly shall
provide funding which is sufficient to provide each child in Kentucky an adequate
education. 9) An adequate education is one which has as its goal the development
of the seven capacities recited previously.
101. 790 S.W.2d at 215.
102. Id. at 216-17 (Gant, J., concurring).
103. 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990).
104. Id. at 366.
105. Benson, supra note 10, at 413.
106. 575 A.2d at 369. The court also noted the change in focus of previous education litigation
away from dollar disparity and toward substantive educational content. Id.
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cient" clause. °7 The New Jersey high court, just as the West Virginia
and Kentucky high courts had done, based a large part of its analysis on
the standard of education necessary to fulfill the state constitution's edu-
cation clause. l08
As these three cases demonstrate, state courts have used their
state's education clauses to invalidate entire school systems, or a limited
number of school districts, not solely on the theory that severe disparate
expenditures were violative of the clause, but on the theory that these
state constitutional education provisions guaranteed students a certain
quality of education that they were not receiving.
No state supreme court has yet held a school system violative of an
education clause based solely on a minimum quality theory. Issues of
finance have always entered the picture. But the trend is unquestionably
headed toward a purely quality-based inquiry. Twenty years ago,
finance was the only issue in education litigation. Within the past six
years, however, state high courts have spoken of educational quality,
educational content, and educational standards. Future opinions will
likely scrutinize educational quality without the slightest reference to
issues of finance.
Under the suggested new litigation paradigm, state and federal
courts would take the above mentioned legal trend to its logical conclu-
sion and scrutinize each state's compliance with its educational duties
solely on the basis of quality. Courts must then decide how to judge
whether a particular school or school system is failing to provide a
legally adequate quality of education.
V. JUDGING THE LEGAL SUFFICIENCY OF A SCHOOL OR SCHOOL
SYSTEM'S QUALITY
A. Using Output Measures, Not Input Measures, to Determine
Whether Schools Are Providing Legally
Adequate Education1°9
Determining whether schools are fulfilling their legal duty to pro-
vide a minimum level of education is complicated by the variety of fac-
tors a court could analyze in answering this question. These factors
generally fall into two categories: (1) The Court can ask the "means"
question by looking at the means, or inputs, the school is using to
achieve this minimum quality of education (special programs, proce-
107. 575 A.2d at 400.
108. See Benson, supra note 10, at 416.
109. When the word "legally" is used in this context, it refers to the legal duty schools have
under either the United States Constitution or the respective state constitution education clauses.
On the source of these duties, see supra parts Il, IV.A.
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dures, taxes, expenditures, student-teacher ratios, administrative effi-
ciency, staff-instructor ratios etc.); or (2) The court can ask the "ends"
question by looking solely at the results of the school's efforts, and the
output of student learning." Because courts historically thought that
the criteria in the "means" question lend themselves more easily to judi-
cial scrutiny, courts asked the "means" question and were reluctant to
simply ask the "ends" question.
In a new litigation paradigm, however, courts would cease to look
at questions of means and focus strictly on the ends analysis in determin-
ing whether a school has met its legal duty. The most obvious reason
for this shift in emphasis is that letting legislators and other politically-
accountable officials determine the precise means by which they will
meet their constitutionally required duty is always preferable. Judicial
inquiries should only concern themselves with determining whether the
required quality standard is being met and with providing plaintiffs a
remedy should they determine the school quality inadequate."'I
Judging educational adequacy through student performance, or out-
put standards, has been advocated since the early 1970s. 1 One scholar
observed in 1976 that "there is evidence to indicate the states are moving
toward a radically different approach to the control of the curriculum;
namely, states are attempting to regulate not what goes into the school
program but what comes out.""1t3 Courts should look to what children
have learned to assess whether schools have complied with their duty to
provide a minimum quality education. The benefits of this type of
approach over an input based approach are numerous.
110. Put another way, the courts can look at what the school bureaucracy is doing or it can
look at what the students are learning.
11. See Section VI for a discussion of the appropriate remedy. Just as a court's inquiry as to
whether the duty is being met should ignore the means used to achieve that duty, the remedy
should also not involve dictates to the schools as to how to comply with the duty.
112. Stephen W. Gard, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez: On Our Way
to Where?, 8 VAL. U. L. Rav. 27, 30 (1973). In its 1971 report, the Committee for Economic
Development stated:
We insist that educational equality must be judged by school "outputs," by the
actual achievements of pupils in intellectual skills, knowledge, creativity, and
action. We believe that the American people should refuse to settle for anything
less than universal literacy and those intellectual skills which accompany literacy.
Except for the less than one per cent of any population group who are incapable of
normal learning, the schools should be expected and required to bring their pupils
up to minimal standards of intellectual achievement-not some of them, but all of
them.
COMM. FOR ECONOMIC DEV., EDUC. FOR THE URBAN DISADVANTAGED: FROM PRESCHOOL TO
EMPLOYMENT 13 (197 1), quoted in Gard at 31. Another commentator has suggested that the court
impose an output requirement on schools in order to comply with the right. See Preovolos, supra
note 43, at 115.
113. VAN GEEL, supra note 43, at 85.
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1. THIS APPROACH IS CONSISTENT WITH PAST JUDICIAL ANALYSIS
As has already been noted, 114 even in the context of equity financ-
ing litigation, courts have recently shown more interest in the quality of
education provided than in the equality of funding. This is true both for
the United States Supreme Court and state supreme courts.
When the United States Supreme Court has spoken of a potential
right to education, it has not spoken in terms of inputs such as specific
spending, specific programs, student/teacher ratios, and the like.
Instead, the Court has spoken of the level of knowledge or learning that
a person must possess to have received a constitutionally adequate edu-
cation. The Court has stated that the education must be so bad that the
meaningful exercise of voting or speech rights are affected. 115 In other
words, persons educated by the state must have a level of education that
allows them to meaningfully exercise their right to freedom of speech
and vote. The Supreme Court's rationale in Rodriguez suggests that the
adequacy of educational opportunity be measured by output, by what
students can do with their education, not what programs schools have
implemented or how much money schools have spent. 1 6 In another
case, the Court accepted the State's proposition that, "some degree of
education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and
intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve freedom
and independence."' 17 Again, the Court's language refers to the level of
knowledge attained by the student-educational ends rather than educa-
tional means. Understanding Rodriguez in this educational-attainment
context supports the argument for judicial measurement of the legal ade-
quacy of education based on what students have learned in school. 1 '
In their education litigation decisions, state supreme courts have
also turned their attention away from input standards and towards per-
formance standards in discussing whether a state has fulfilled its obliga-
tion under the state constitution education clause. Even in an early
education finance case, the New Jersey Supreme Court defined the state
constitution's guarantee as providing students the education "needed in
the contemporary setting to equip a child for his role as a citizen and as a
competitor in the labor market."' 19 Other state courts have also focused
on what the student should actually learn. 120
114. See supra part III, IV.B.
115. San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1972).
116. See, e.g., 411 U.S. at 88 (Marshall, J., dissenting) discussed in Gard, supra note 112, at
32.
117. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972).
118. Bitensky, supra note 16, at 637.
119. Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 295 (1973).
120. See supra part IV.B.1-3.
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2. BY STRICTLY LOOKING AT EDUCATIONAL ENDS, COURTS NEED NOT
ENGAGE IN THE DEBATE ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
CERTAIN EDUCATIONAL INPUTS AND
EDUCATIONAL OUTPUTS
Input-based measurements are inherently flawed because they do
not necessarily reflect what students have learned in school; they focus
on the wrong side of the equation. The inputs that work in one school
district may be totally ineffective or irrelevant in another. For plaintiffs
or courts to use input-based measurements in determining the legal ade-
quacy of an education, they must make a causal connection between
input and output. This type of proof has been difficult, however,
because expert opinion is divided on this question. No positive correla-
tion has been established between particular inputs and student perform-
ance. The 1991 National Assessment of Educational Progress test of
eighth-graders' math skills serves as evidence of this failure. North
Dakota, ranked 32nd in the nation in terms of per-pupil spending, per-
formed the best while the District of Columbia, which spends the most
per student, finished second to last.'2 ' Utah spent less money per stu-
dent than every other state in the union in 1992, $2,993, yet ranked 4th
and 8th respectively among all states in SAT and NAEP scores. 122
Given this evidence, findings based strictly on inputs offer little to
courts about the actual learning taking place in the school. The Supreme
Court in Rodriguez noted the seemingly intractable nature of this
dilemma:
[O]ne of the major sources of controversy concerns the extent to
which there is a demonstrable correlation between educational
expenditures and the quality of education .... The ultimate wisdom
as to these and related problems of education is not likely to be
divined for all time even by the scholars who now so earnestly debate
the issues. 123
As the Court rightly predicted, scholars are no closer today than
they were 20 years ago in proving these correlations. 124 By looking only
to the outcomes of educational practices, courts need not consider the
input question, thus removing the input-output causation problem alto-
gether. 125 Plaintiffs can then sidestep the task of proving that more
121. Kantrowitz & Wingert, supra note 22, at 65.
122. See Bruno Manno, Deliver Us from Clinton's Schools Bill, supra note 11, at A 14.
123. San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1972).
124. "Any correlation between funding and educational results is tenuous at best." Carrollton-
Farmers v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d 498, 531 (Tex. 1992). "A majority of studies
have indicated that there is no strong correlation between expenditures and educational quality."
Preovolos, supra note 43, at 117 (citation omitted).
125. See Liebman, supra note 11, at 431 n.281.
[Vol. 48:913
EDUCATION EMANCIPATION
inputs provides more education.' 26
3. ALLOWS COURTS TO JUDGE ADEQUACY OF EDUCATION WITHOUT
MAKING EDUCATIONAL POLICY
By declining to use input-based standards in determining whether
the state has fulfilled its duty to provide the required level of education,
courts can escape deciding on the merit of one particular educational
policy versus another. Courts can avoid placing themselves into this
policy-making role by simply scrutinizing the student performance
indicators rather than the particular educational policies adopted by the
school system. 127 "By simply looking to the results of the educational
process, the courts can avoid becoming enmeshed in debates over educa-
tional policy, an area in which the judiciary lacks the specialized knowl-
edge and expertise.' 28 The resulting simplification of analysis reduces
the issue to a pure question of whether or not the schools are meeting
their legal duty, and leaves educators to determine the best way to meet
this duty.' 29 Schools would be free to experiment as they wished, as
long as the court's output requirements were met.
B. The Use of Competency Tests
In the absence of legislative guidance, courts should adopt a stan-
dard based on educational outputs (i.e. knowledge acquired by the stu-
dents, competency tests). Output measurement is the most manageable,
most successful, and most reliable indicator of the actual level of learn-
ing taking place in the schools. Output standards address the judicial
reticence toward defining the content of a minimal education because
they are judicially manageable and easily enforceable. 130
How exactly would courts measure outputs? Through the well-rec-
ognized and commonly-used method of measuring student knowledge,
standard proficiency tests.131 These standardized achievement tests,
although not without their detractors, are uniformly and extensively used
by the schools. At least one court has described these tests as the "most
126. McUsic, supra note 60, at 310.
127. See id.
128. Gard, supra note 112, at 33-34.
129. Id. at 34.
130. Preovolos, supra note 43, at 115. Output measures may not be as conceptually simple or
as easily quantifiable as input measurements, but can easily be measured by student achievement
tests. See McUsic, supra note 60, at 316.
131. See Chambers, supra note 28, at 61 n.27: "Achievement levels required for entrance into
the military, societally accepted reading and math norms as reflected by newspapers and modes of
exchange, and basic competency standards might all be applied to the task of defining adequate
education."
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objective standard now in use for measuring educational progress." 132
Under the duty to educate in the United States Constitution, a federal
court would probably require that students attain specified achievement
levels in certain basic skills that would provide him/her with meaningful
access to the political system. 133 State courts, under the duty to educate
demanded by their constitutions, could require a higher level of profi-
ciency than would be imposed by a federal court. Such broader require-
ments could include student passage of basic high school competency
tests.' 34 Some commentators suggest that in setting achievement levels,
courts should follow the standards set by state legislatures. 135 Courts, in
the absence of such legislative assistance, could employ a set of nation-
ally accepted standards.1 36
A concern with this competency or proficiency testing approach is
that the school system may be held legally accountable for poor student
performance where the cause of a student's or a small group of students'
poor performance rests not with the school at all, but elsewhere. The
students, not the schools, may be at fault for poor performance. 137 A
practical and workable solution would be to impose a prima facie burden
upon the plaintiffs to show that "not just a few but many or most stu-
dents in a given school fail tests not only on the first but also on succes-
sive tries."' 38 For example, this could occur where seventy-five percent
of a school or school district fail to meet an established educational stan-
dard. The presumption would then arise that the school system was not
fulfilling its duty, resulting in poor student performance.' 3 9 The school
could attempt overcome this presumption by offering contrary proof.'"
The key to this practical solution is holding the school or school system
legally liable only where it produced a disproportionate number of fail-
ing students. 141
VI. REMEDY
Just as courts need a paradigm shift in the way they determine what
constitutes a constitutionally adequate education, courts must also shift
132. Gard, supra note 112, at 33 (citations omitted).
133. See Preovolos, supra note 43, at 115.
134. Id.
135. See McUsic, supra note 60, at 330.
136. McUsic, supra note 60, at 330.
137. Ratner, supra note 13, at 794-95.
138. Liebman, supra note 11, at 390.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Leroy D. Clark, The Future Civil Rights Agenda: Speculation on Litigation, Legislation,
and Organization, 38 CArm. U. L. Ray. 795, 804 (1989). See also Ratner, supra note 13, at 785-
94.
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away from using constitutionally inadequate educational remedies. In
the past, a typical judicial remedy included a mandate or requirement for
the schools or the legislature to perform a specific action. More money
is often thought to be a cure-all for every type of education distress.
This assertion, however, is no longer credible. 142 As the Supreme Court
of New Jersey stated in 1990, "[B]eyond doubt... money alone has not
worked." 143 Although courts and legal scholars have preferred them in
the past, 144 little evidence exists to suggest that the input-oriented pro-
grams previously tried had much positive impact. 145 The success of
other judicially mandated remedies is also dubious. Even when plain-
tiffs have walked out of court as successful litigants, full redress is rarely
achieved. 146 These traditional remedies raise other problems such as
judicial activism into educational policies. Recognizing the limitations
of these traditional remedies and the urgency of the education crisis's
effect on minorities, the Director-Counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense
and Educational Fund, Julius Chambers, stated in 1987, "we cannot
afford to overlook new ways in which to remedy the immediate harm
now befalling so many poor and black students."' 47
An innovative remedy is available which would avoid the pitfalls of
previous remedies, while simultaneously providing aggrieved plaintiffs
an adequate education, without the usual delay that accompanies tradi-
tional judicial remedies. This innovative approach would grant injunc-
tive relief, giving the aggrieved plaintiffs the pro rata share of their
children's state-allotted education funds to use at a quality school of the
plaintiff's choice. Inner-city parents are then empowered to choose the
same educational options and opportunities now exclusively possessed
by those with significant financial means.
The irony of the political and academic concern over the failing
142. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text. See also Liebman, supra note 11, at 392-93.
One anecdotal example is found in the story of two Missouri counties, South Callaway and Osage.
South Callaway County has half as many students (2,778 vs. 5,684) and spends almost twice as
much money per student ($5,854 vs. $3,133) than Osage County, yet has a dropout rate over five
times higher than Osage's, and average ACT scores lower than Osage. See Ron Stodghill II, A
Tale of Two School Districts, Bus. WK., Aug. 2, 1993, at 63. Houston's Hollibrook Accelerated
Elementary School serves a students body where 85% are from non-English speaking homes and
spends far less than the state's average of $3,939 per student. Yet over the past five years,
Hollibrook's fifth grade students went from a third-grade to a fifth-grade level of achievement on
their mean scores for reading, math, and social studies. Stephanie Anderson Forest, True or
False: More Money Buys Better Schools, Bus. WK., Aug. 2, 1993, at 63.
143. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 404 (N.J. 1990).
144. See generally Ratner supra note 13; Liebman, supra note 11.
145. Hanushek, supra note 5, at 452.
146. See, e.g., Note, Unfulfilled Promises: School Finance Remedies and State Courts, 104
HAgv. L. REv. 1072, 1078 (1991).
147. Chambers, supra note 28, at 73.
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quality of the nation's inner city schools is that some educational suc-
cess stories exist in inner urban areas.' 48 Perhaps the reason for the rela-
tive lack of judicial and academic focus on these successful schools is
that many of them are not operated by the government, but rather, exist
in the private sector. These private schools exist in the very same neigh-
borhoods as the government-run schools and yet provide "at-risk" chil-
dren with an education over and above constitutionally required
standards.' 4
9
A good example of this is New York City where the public govern-
ment-operated schools spend $7,300 per student.' 50 At the private Car-
dinal Hayes High School in the South Bronx, per student spending is a
meager $2,300.151 Ironically, over three times as much money is spent
per pupil at William H. Taft High School, a public school, than at Cardi-
nal Hayes, only a few blocks away. Yet incredibly, ninety-eight percent
of Cardinal Hayes seniors graduate, while the dropout rate at William H.
Taft High is nearly forty percent. 52
Some attempt to explain the success of the inner city non-govern-
ment schools with misinformed stereotypes about these schools' ability
to selectively admit good students and screen out bad students. Accord-
ing to former Education Secretary William Bennett, only twelve percent
of applicants to Catholic schools are rejected, while eighty-eight percent
are accepted.1 53 These facts may suggest that the screening that takes
place in many inner-city private schools is minimal and that these inner-
city private schools are able to succeed while drawing from the same
student population as the public schools.
Courts should no longer ignore and discriminate against these non-
government schools when crafting remedies for students receiving sub-
standard education. Indeed, non-government operated schools are part
of the solution to the education crisis in America's inner cities. Granting
aggrieved plaintiffs the pro rata share of state funds allotted for their
child's education offers numerous benefits and advantages over tradi-
tional judicial mandate-type remedies.
148. See Ratner, supra note 13, at 795-808.
149. For an excellent presentation of successful inner city non-government schools that work,
see PAUL T. HILL ET AL., HIGH SCHOOLS WITH CHARACTER (1990).
150. See Mydans, supra note 40, at A7.
151. Michael Specter, Catholic School Cash Crisis; Private Cutbacks Pose Public Problem in
Cities, WASH. POST, May 14, 1991, at Al.
152. Id.
153. Bennett Plan Blurs Church-State Line, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 8, 1988, at C4. Admittedly,
Catholic schools are only one subset of non-government education providers, but this figure
certainly damages the stereotype that attributes the success of non-government schools to school
selectivity.
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A. Unlike Other Possible Traditional Remedies, a Voucher Remedy
Gives Students Immediate Relief
The most attractive and strongest attribute of a voucher remedy is
the speed with which it gives plaintiffs relief; the results are instantane-
ous. Aggrieved plaintiffs begin receiving a constitutionally required
quality of education the day after a judge grants the remedy. A voucher
remedy sharply contrasts to traditional education remedies that take
years, or even decades to implement, 15 4 while each student who contin-
ues to receive inferior education suffers irreparable harm indefinitely.
A voucher remedy eliminates this tragic human cost of lengthy
reform efforts. While the schools and legislature implement the reforms
needed to bring the quality of inner-city schools up to constitutional ade-
quacy, students in those schools will get an adequate education in a
qualified school. Without such an immediate remedy, students could
languish in substandard schools for years before an improvement in
school quality takes place, irreparably harming the future economic
opportunity of these children and their ability to compete in the labor
market. Once the schools meet the minimum quality standard required
by the court, the need for the remedy would no longer exist and it would
be terminated.
B. A Voucher Remedy Equalizes Power of Choice for Minorities
A voucher remedy can do what no other remedy, including equali-
zation of school funding, can do; it gives the poor and the less fortunate
more control and power over the decisions that affect their lives. As
Professor Hanushek noted, "the economically disadvantaged are handi-
capped by less ability to secure good schooling through moving-the
route to better schooling by middle- and upper-income families."' 5
Moreover, minorities living in the inner cities are disproportionately
harmed by this lack of options because many middle-class whites have
pursued quality education in suburban areas.' 56 Families with substan-
tial resources can either leave a school that they regard as unfit by mov-
ing to another district, or they can pay tuition at a private school. 157
Families dissatisfied with a legally inadequate school who do not have
154. For example, in a concurring opinion in Carrollton-Farmers v. Edgewood Indep. Sch.
Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489, 525 (1992), Justice Comyn predicted that the school finance litigation that
began in 1984 would not be resolved until at least 1994, maybe longer, while also noting that the
case had dominated three Texas Supreme Court opinions.
155. Hanushek, supra note 5, at 453.
156. Stephen Arons, Educational Choice as a Civil Rights Strategy, in PUBLIC VALUES,
PRIVATE SCHOOLS 63 (Neal E. Devins ed., 1989).
157. Id. at 73.
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these resources have no options-they are bonded to substandard
schools.
Providing aggrieved plaintiffs with vouchers would equalize power
in a very different manner than the traditional idea of equalizing finan-
cial resources between school districts. Vouchers given to minority par-
ents living in inner cities would help equalize power among all
families. 58 As Stephen Arons has stated, "Schooling ... will become
truly public only when choice and bargaining power are truly equal
among all families."' 59 This family-equalizing judicial remedy would
break the "link between residential location and school quality," and
between economic resources and educational opportunity."6 Regardless
of a family's residential mobility or economic ability to afford a private
school, all children would have roughly the same opportunity to attain a
legally adequate education.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey said it best, while admittedly in
another context, when it stated, "[t]hey [students] have the right to the
same educational opportunity that money buys for others."'' The basic
premise behind the court's language also animates the need for a
voucher remedy for students suffering from inadequate educations: edu-
cation is a public good that should not be allocated based upon wealth or
class, and even those at the bottom of the social or economic strata
should have access to the same educational opportunities as those at the
wealthier levels of society.' 6 2
Because a voucher remedy for aggrieved inner-city plaintiffs
uniquely addresses this problem, it plays a central part of the new educa-
158. "Family choice for the nonrich could lead to an end of the American double standard:
Among those who can afford private school, society leaves the goals and means of education to
the family; for the rest of society, the informing principles are politically determined and
implemented through compulsory assignment to a particular public school." JOHN E. COONS &
STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY CHOICE 2-3 (1978).
159. Arons, supra note 156, at 72.
160. Hanushek, supra note 5, at 453.
161. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 363 (N.J. 1990).
162. A similar argument can be made in this context based on the 1924 Supreme Court
decision in Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1924). In that case, the Supreme Court ruled
unconstitutional under the 14th Amendment an Oregon law which required all parents to send
their children to public schools, thus establishing a parental right to send their children to the
school of their choice without interference from the state. Although the Supreme Court has
determined that this right belongs to parents, only those parents with sufficient financial means
have the ability to exercise it. An argument can be made that by intentionally depriving parents of
the financial means to exercise this right, the state functionally deprives parents of their
constitutional rights. In the modem context, a similar argument is often made regarding poor
women's inability, due to a lack of financial resources, to exercise certain privacy rights
pertaining to abortion. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.
464 (1977).
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tional litigation paradigm.' 63
C. A Voucher Remedy Will Deter Continuation of Policies That Do
Irreparable Harm to the Students Receiving
Inadequate Education
Penalizing schools to deter them from continuing ineffective prac-
tices is a desirable method.'64 If a court finds that a government school
system is providing a legally inadequate education and aggrieved plain-
tiffs are given court-ordered vouchers, the government school system
will lose money proportionate to the number of students who decide to
leave it. This remedy will do something no other remedy has done: link
the interests of institutional actors with the interests of minority inner-
city students. Once this linkage is established, one would expect all the
complacency and benign neglect of the failing schools to come to a
screeching halt. In short, the judicial voucher remedy would provide a
powerful disincentive for school systems and legislatures to ignore the
educational inadequacies of their worst schools.
This remedy is performance-oriented because it sets up an incentive
system that rewards successful schools, while penalizing substandard
schools. The quantity of inputs will become less important than the
quality of output. Schools will be deterred from piling ineffective pro-
grams upon ineffective programs and will seek to maximize the quality
of education with its given resources. With a voucher remedy regime in
place, society can expect a greater efficiency and effectiveness in
education.
D. A Voucher Remedy Does Not Require Courts to Know What to
Tell Schools to Do to Fix the Problem
While judges and legal scholars have recognized the problems in
the inner-city schools, they are generally reluctant to propose remedial
measures because there is no academic consensus regarding what pre-
cisely should be done to improve the quality of education in these
schools. 6 In the words of the United States Supreme Court, "the court-
163. The desire of urban minority parents to exercise the same options as those with greater
financial resources has been overwhelmingly demonstrated in cities where private voucher funds
have been established. See Patricia Faman, A Choice for Etta Wallace, POL'Y REV., Spring 1993,
at 24. A poll done by the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies found that 88 percent of
black Americans approve of private-school vouchers. See John J. Miller, Whose Choice?,
NAT ONAL REv., Dec. 14, 1992, at 44. Equalizing power would appear to be an attractive reason
for minority parents to support such proposals.
164. See Ratner, supra note 13, at 810.
165. Liebman, supra note 11, at 415. When courts shed this reluctance, they do so
ambiguously. Legislators and scholars must then guess which measures would receive court
approval. See Parker & Weiss, supra note 31, at 600-01. Guessing results in an incredible waste
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room is not the arena for debating issues of educational policy.,1 66 This
attitude is further typified by the statement of Dean Mark G. Yudof in
1973: "The truth is that we know very little about the relationship
between particular resources and policies and educational outcomes...
."16' Dean Yudof also stated that, "the problem here is not one of 'will
not' but one of 'cannot.' ",168 He concluded that only when empirical
evidence can establish a successful course of action will judicial inter-
vention be appropriate. 69
Some scholars address this problem by arguing that empirical evi-
dence of successful educational strategies for inner-city schools is now
available,1 70 and by proposing that courts require schools to mandate
"minimum standards" promulgated by state legislatures.' 7'
The presumption that judges must possess favorable empirical evi-
dence for particular reforms, policies, practices, and expenditures before
they grant remedies is no longer useful or practical in light of the depth
and scope of the damage inflicted on minority students in inner-cities
and in light of the availability of innovative remedies not requiring judi-
cial educational policy-making. In fact, the entire presumption that
judges be omniscient in matters of educational policy before granting
relief is based on the misconception that all judicial educational reme-
dies must come in the form of an order to the schools to take some
judicially mandated action. This philosophy is understandable in light
of the traditional judicial experience with school systems that began with
the Supreme Court's desegregation order in Brown. Courts should
accept the fact that they may never possess the expertise needed to order
specific mandates upon schools, especially when remedies are available
that do not require this presumptive judicial certitude. 172 One such rem-
edy is the voucher regime.
One of the many strengths of providing inner-city plaintiffs with a
voucher remedy is that it does not require judges to know what works.
It leaves the problem of what works in the rightful hands of those most
competent to address it-the teachers, administrators and educators who
of time, resources, and energy. Were the court to simply define the constitutionally required
quality of education as proposed in Section V.B and grant plaintiffs the voucher remedy, there
would no longer be a need for this wasteful legal guessing game.
166. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 598 (1940).
167. Mark G. Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity and the Courts, 51 TEX. L. Rav. 411,
422 (1985).
168. Id. at 418.
169. See id. at 430.
170. Ratner, supra note 13, at 795-804.
171. See generally Liebman, supra note 11.
172. "Obviously, we are no more able to identify what these disadvantaged students need in
concrete educational terms than are the experts." Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 401 (N.J. 1990).
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work on the front lines in the schools. The judge's sole responsibility is
to determine whether students are provided with a legally sufficient edu-
cation, and if he/she finds that they are not, to provide a remedy that
guarantees such an education. The court need not look to how this goal
is achieved by educators, only that it is being achieved. Courts need not
engage in academic debate over which educational policies, practices,
and expenditure levels are most effective. The school systems and state
legislatures will resolve these questions on their own. Courts would, in
effect, say to the schools and other political institutions, "just do it, and
in the meantime, these aggrieved plaintiffs will receive a constitutionally
adequate education at a qualifying school." The voucher remedy pre-
vents unnecessary judicial intrusion into educational policy matters best
left to educators while simultaneously providing the plaintiffs with a
quality education.
The second component is often forgotten when discussing the
problems of educating inner city minority students: there are both gov-
ernment and non-government school systems which effectively provide
inner-city minority students with high quality education. These success-
ful schools demonstrate that inner city education is not an unsolvable
mystery. 173
E. Voucher Remedy Does Not Require Force
As noted briefly above, providing plaintiffs with a voucher remedy
is distinct from other remedies because it does not require or force
schools to take any specific action. The non-force nature of this remedy
is beneficial because it encourages schools and legislatures to arrive at
reform measures through democratic processes rather than through
undemocratic judicial mandates.
Judicial respect for allowing the representative branches of govern-
ment the freedom to experiment and address social problems was aptly
stated by the Supreme Court in Rodriguez: "[T]he judiciary is well
advised to refrain from imposing on the States inflexible constitutional
restraints that could circumscribe or handicap the continued research and
experimentation so vital to finding even partial solutions to educational
problems and to keeping abreast of ever-changing conditions. '174 A
voucher remedy would avoid direct judicial intrusion into the govern-
ance of schools.' Others have noted the importance of leaving the
means of accomplishing effective educational practices to the represen-
173. See supra notes 148-152 and accompanying text.
174. San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 43 (1972).
175. See John S. Elson, Suing to Make Schools Effective, or How to Make a Bad Situation
Worse: A Response to Ratner, 63 TEx. L. Rv. 889, 904 (1985).
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tative departments of government,' 76 and the need for experimentation
to solve education problems."' This remedy reduces the anti-demo-
cratic nature of judicial decrees. As well, one would expect that volun-
tary educational reform would be exercised with more vigor and interest
than court-imposed reform.
F. A Voucher Remedy Could Potentially Provide Inner-City Students
with a More Integrated Learning Environment
Even almost forty years after Brown, the issue of school desegrega-
tion remains alive. Judicial efforts aimed at integrating America's
schools have met with mixed success and recent evidence suggests that
an unintended resegregation of the schools is taking place. The unique
aspect of this recent resegregation is that it eludes the corrective reach of
traditional judicial remedies. Along with its primary goal of providing
students with a legally adequate education, state-funded education
vouchers could also assist integration efforts in the cities as a secondary
goal. Ironically, the traditional view among legal scholars and commen-
tators was that private schools posed a problem to desegregation efforts.
But through the voucher remedy, private schools can become part of the
solution to the resegregation problem. 78
The 1974 Supreme Court case of Milliken v. Bradley7 9 exempted
surrounding suburban areas from the reach of urban school desegrega-
tion orders absent proof of segregation by the suburban schools.1
8 0
Some legal commentators have cited this case as a further encourage-
ment of white flight to suburban areas.' 8' Whether urban whites were
keeping up with the latest Supreme Court decisions is uncertain, but the
demographic trends are clear.
In 1974, when a federal court ordered forced busing in Boston, the
city school system serviced 93,000 students.' 8 2 In 1985, this number
had dwindled to 57,000 students. In 1975, white students made up 65%
of the school population. In 1985, whites comprised only 28% of the
176. Carrollton-Farmers v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489, 534 (Tex. 1992).
177. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 398-99 n.30 (N.J. 1990). See also Liebman, supra note
11, at 395.
178. Stephen D. Sugarman, Part of the Solution Rather than Part of the Problem: A Role for
American Private Elementary and Secondary Schools in the 1990s, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 681
(1990) (reviewing PUBLIC VALUES, PRIVATE SCHOOLS (Neal E. Devins ed., 1989)).
179. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
180. Id. at 744-45. See generally Wendy R. Brown, The Convergence of Neutrality and
Choice: The Limits of the State's Affirmative Duty to Provide Equal Educational Opportunity, 60
TENN. L. REV. 63, 103 (1992).
181. Clark, supra note 141, at 800.
182. Timothy J. McNulty, Roots of Underclass Found in Racism, Failed Policies, CHI. TIUB.,
Sept. 16, 1985, at Cl.
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school population. 8 3 The population of the city of Boston itself is 70%
white.1 8 4 In Minneapolis, minority students made up 21% of public
school enrollment in 1975, but by 1991-92 that number increased to
54% . 1 In neighboring St. Paul, minority enrollment went from 14% in
1975 to more than 45% in 1991-92.186 In New York City, minorities
comprise more than 80% of the public school population.'8 7 In Hart-
ford, Connecticut, whites accounted for over half the student body in
1974, but now make up roughly 20%.11a In Chicago in 1990, three out
of four black children and two out of three Hispanic children attended
Chicago public schools, while only one of twenty white children
attended Chicago's public schools."8 9 As a result of the changing
demography of urban schools, some school boards have given up on
integration and envision all-black schools as inevitable.1 90 This evi-
dence suggests that America has regressed to a "separate but unequal"
school system with minorities attending urban public schools and whites
attending urban private or suburban public school of their choice.19' A
perfect example of this occurred recently in Philadelphia where a
twenty-four-year-old segregation lawsuit was revived. In the twenty-
four years since the litigation began, the percentage of white students in
the Philadelphia district, "has fallen by more than one-third, to 23 per-
cent, as families moved to the suburbs or put their children in the city's
private and parochial schools." '192 Yet while 77% of the students in the
public school population are minorities, they represent only 47% of the
city's entire population. 93 In 1984, 63.5% of black students and 70.6%
of Hispanic students attended schools where minorities constituted over
183. Id.
184. Dudley Clendinen, Hope of Desegregation is Fading in Boston's Troubled Schools, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 1, 1982, at A18.
185. James Walsh, 'Brown' Revisited: Can Separate Schooling Be Equal?, STAR TRIB., Sept.
19, 1992, at IA.
186. Id.
187. Neil A. Lewis, Court Hears Arguments in Key Desegregation Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8,
1991, at A23.
188. Robert A. Frahm, Expert Backs Boston Plan for Desegregation, THE HARTFORD
COURANT, Jan. 14, 1993, at Bi.
189. See Galster, supra note 37, at 1439.
190. Barbara Vobejda, P.G. 'Compensatory' Schools: A Quandary, WASH. POST, Mar. 12,
1986, at Al.
191. See, e.g., ROBERT L. CRAIN & CHRISTINE H. ROSSELL, Catholic Schools and Racial
Segregation, in PUBLIC VALUES, PRIVATE SCHOOLS 184 (Neal E. Devins ed., 1989). For
additional statistical information on urban school segregation rates, see generally Galster, supra
note 37, at 1455-61.
192. Michael deCourcy Hinds, Busing Debated in Philadelphia, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1993, at
All.
193. Id.
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half of the student body.1 94 These apparent disparities are easy to
explain. Urban whites have taken advantage of their economic ability
by moving away from urban areas or by placing their children in private
schools. Minority families in urban areas lack this ability and their chil-
dren are therefore left in urban schools with increasing concentrations of
minorities.
Equalizing the power between minority parents and non-minority
parents would not only level the education-quality playing field, but it
would also give minority children access to more integrated learning
environments. Providing minority parents with the proposed voucher
remedy could achieve higher levels of integration without being subject
to the "forced busing" complaint that has proved so troublesome in past
desegregation judicial efforts. 19 5
One group of plaintiffs has already attempted to receive vouchers in
a desegregation case. 196 In Rivarde ex rel. Rivarde v. Missouri,1 97 black
students who were members of a certified class brought a separate action
asking the court to provide them with funds to attend either the govern-
ment or private school of their choice. Fifty non-government schools,
many with less than a five percent minority enrollment, agreed to par-
ticipate in the desegregation remedy.' 98  After five years of court-
ordered desegregation, the Kansas City District schools remained over-
whelmingly black, and spending per student was between $6,000 and
$9,000 per year.' 99 The Kansas City school population was only 26%
white. 20 0 The court ruled that because the plaintiffs stated no separate
cause of action, they could not seek to modify the plan of the original
litigation.2°'
Although the court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim in this case, the
simplicity and efficiency of the Rivarde plaintiffs' segregation remedy
194. Chambers, supra note 28, at 58 n.14.
195. Liebman, supra note I1, at 395. The concept of using vouchers to promote integration
also applies in other social areas. President Clinton's Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development is examining the feasibility of expanding "voucher programs that give public
housing residents the opportunities to move to private apartments in the suburbs." Jason DeParle,
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contrasts with the extravagant remedy approved by the federal court.
While the Rivarde plaintiffs sought only $1,500 to $3,000 per student
per year to cover the costs of integrating their children into private
schools (compared with the $6,000 to $9,000 spent per student by the
public schools), the school board, hoping to comply with the judge's
desegregation order, ordered construction of a $32 million high school
featuring an Olympic-sized swimming pool and track, racquetball
courts, a new stadium, whirlpool baths, and a personal computer for
almost every student-all just to induce a meager 460 white students to
enroll.2 o2
Under the quality of education theory proposed in this Comment,
the voucher remedy is designed to instantly provide aggrieved plaintiffs
with a legally adequate education. The above discussion shows that a
byproduct of this remedy could also be to enhance desegregation where
traditional paradigm remedies have failed.
VII. CONCLUSION
The problems facing America's educational system are clear.
While this Comment cannot attempt to solve the larger problem of
reforming the nation's educational system, it has attempted to demon-
strate the need for the law to develop a new approach and a new way to
think about helping society's neediest children achieve equal educational
opportunity. Recent trends suggest that such a new approach is evolv-
ing. As traditional legal constructs become antiquated in a changing
society, new legal paradigms must emerge. This Comment has outlined
a potential blueprint for such a transformation. It begins by recognizing
a source of governmental duty within the Federal and State Constitu-
tions to provide a certain quality of education, by showing the benefits
of measuring the fulfillment of this duty by student learning, and con-
cludes by granting aggrieved plaintiffs a voucher remedy. This
reinvented litigation paradigm offers promise for students whose future
depends on receiving an education that will enable them to lead produc-
tive lives.
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